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The Supreme Court decision in Nash hopefully resolves the
controversy over disposition of a bad debt reserve upon the transfer
of assets in a section 351 exchange. However, the opinion does not
go so far as to say that a bad debt reserve may never be restored to
income in a section 351 transfer. The decision was based on an exchange of assets for stock equal to the net value of accounts receivable. Therefore, where it can be determined that the value of stock issued to the transferor represents the face value of accounts receivable and disregards the bad debt reserve, there would be a "recovery" within the meaning of the tax benefit rule, and the recovery
would be considered a taxable event. Whether or not the Nash decision will be applied to a section 33726 liquidation with a similar

factual situation is left unanswered; however, in light of the economic
realities test applied in Schmidt and the apparent adoption of that
principle by the Supreme Court in Nash, it seems likely that a section 337 liquidation would not be considered a taxable event.
Dennis C. Sauter

Constitutional Law-Freedom of ReligionTax Exempt Status of Church Property
The plaintiff, an owner of real property, brought suit in the
New York courts seeking to enjoin the New York City Tax
Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious
organizations on properties used solely for religious purposes. These
exemptions were authorized by state constitutional' and statutory
2

6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337 (a) General Rule.- If-

(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or
after June 22, 1954, and (2) within the 12-month period beginning
on the date of the adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the
corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets
retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized
to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property
within such 12-month period.
'N. Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1:

Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general
laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting
real or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational
or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or
more of such purposes and not operating for profit.
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provisions, 2 but the plaintiff contended the exemptions indirectly
required him to make a contribution to religious organizations in
violation of his first amendment rights.3 The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the complaint, and
this was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court'
and the New York Court of Appeals.5
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. 6
Held: the exemptions were not unconstitutional. Even though interactions between church and state are proscribed by the first amendment, the proscription cannot be absolute. Establishment of a
religion by the state connotes a greater involvement than the mere
exemption of property from taxation. Walz v. Tax Commission of
the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)."
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, did not deal with
the primary argument of plaintiff in Walz, i.e., whether a tax exemption is a subsidy. Instead the Court was satisfied with looking at
the historical aspect of tax exemptions, saying:
It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use,
even when that span of time covers our entire national
existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice
of according the exemption to churches, openly and by
affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is
not something to be lightly cast aside. . .. '
The Court, putting great emphasis on historical precedent, was
aided by past decisions which drew the line between church and
2 New York Real Property Tax Law § 420 (McKinney 1958):
Real property owned by a corporation or association organized
exclusively
for the moral
mental
improvement
of men and
women,
or for religious,
bible, ortract,
charitable,
benevolent,
missionary,
hospital,
infirmary,
educational,
public
playground,
scientific,
literary,
bar association, medical
society,
library,
patriotic,
historical
or
cemetery purposes . . .and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes. ., shall be exempt from taxation
as
provided in this section.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I, provides in part that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof....e"
4 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
5 24 N.Y.2d 30, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711, 246 N.E.2d 517 (1969).
6395 U.S. 957 (1969).
7397 U.S. 664 (1970), affg 24 N.Y.2d 30, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711, 246

N.E.2d 517 (1969), affg 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
8 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
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state. The holding in Walz is easier to understand after one
examines those cases which influenced the Walz decision.
Past cases have upheld as constitutional a New Jersey statute
providing bus service to all children attending public and parochial
schools; 9 a New York law lending textbooks free to all students,
public and parochial; 0 a Maryland statute designating Sunday a day
of rest; 1 and a New York program excusing pupils from public
instruction to take religious training outside the school. 2 However,
in close decisions requiring minute examination of cases involving
the Religion Clauses, the Court has held unconstitutional: a Maryland program allowing religious teaching on school property during
school hours;' 3 a Pennsylvania statute requiring daily Bible readings;14 and a school district's order requiring daily recitation of a
New York Regents' prayer.15
The decisions interpreting the religion clauses fall into three
general categories-active cooperation," absolute separation,' 7 and
co-operative separation. 8 The third doctrine presently used by the
9 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Writing for the
majority, Mr. Justice Black reasoned that, because of the legitimate secular
interest in education, the state could not deny the benefits of busing to
children because of their faith. In a West Virginia case, State ex rel. Hughes
v. Board of Educ.. 174 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1970), the court held that a
law giving county boards of education the authority to provide at public
expense adequate means of transportation for all school-age children living
more than two miles from school required the county boards to provide
transportation for parochial school children when such boards provided bus
transportation at public expense for public school children.
Lending textbooks
10 Board of Educ., v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
free to public and parochial students was upheld as a benefit to children, not
schools.
11 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court decided the
state had a legitimate interest in providing a day of rest, and the fact that the
day was Sunday did not bar the state from achieving its secular interest.
12 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
13 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court said
that releasing pupils for religious training was "beyond all question" the use
of the tax supported public school system "to aid religious groups to spread
Id. at 210.
their faith."
' 4 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Court held that requiring
prayers in school was not advancing secular interests and was in violation of
the first amendment.
School Dist., v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
1- Abingdon
The statute required daily Bible readings and the recital of the
Lord's Prayer in unison.
16 30 ALBANY L. Rav. 58, 60, 61 (1966). Active cooperation has been
rejected by the Court for the past two decades. It means only that the
cannot give one religion preferential treatment over others.
government
' 7 1d. at 60, 61. Absolute separation prohibiting all intercourse between
the spheres of governmental activity-direct or indirect-has also been rejected. See e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
18 Id. 30 ALBANY L. Rnv. 58, 60, 61 (1966).
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Court, recognizes separation of church and state but rejects the
view that an application of the principle necessarily prohibits all
intercourse between the two. 9 Combining the "cooperative separation" concept with the two-fold test set forth in Schemmpp ° for
judging the relationship of legislative enactments to religion-the
purpose and the effect of the enactment-'
the Court seemed to
have a safe foundation for the Walz decision. True to precedent, the
Court was consistent in maintaining the wall separating church and
state while at the same time advancing a legitimate secular interest.2
However, the rule that a state may not pass laws to "aid one religion,
all religions, or prefer one religion over another" still endures.2 3
After examining religion clause cases prior to Walz and upon
consideration of tradition in this country, it would have been virtually impossible for the Court to have reached any decision other
than to uphold the tax exemptions. However, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, may have sidestepped the real issue: Is
the tax exemption a subsidy and thus a violation of the establishment
clause? Instead, he warned against too much rigidity,2" and further
explained that in today's complex society some contact between
church and state is inevitable. 2
The Court noted that the exempt property is within a broad
class of property owned by non-profit, quasi-public corporations,
and believed taxation of such property would be against the public
interest.26 The Court lightly passed over the subsidy issue, admitting
that churches are indirectly benefited, but applying the strictest
definition to subsidy 8 and denying that exemptions are subsidies,
219 Id.

Abington

School

Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1960); see note 15

supra.

21 If the purpose or primary effect of the enactment is "the advancement
or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand
the strictures of the establishment clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1960).
22 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2
1 Id. at 15.

24 397 U.S. 664,
25 Id. at 676.
26 Id. at 673.
27

669 (1970).

1d.at 674.
28 One such definition was set forth in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State
Tax Comm'n., 60 F. Supp. 181, 182 (D.C. Utah 1944). The court held,
"[S]ubsidy . . . is . . . usually money, donated or given or appropriated by

the Government through its proper agencies... "
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since the government does not grant part of its funds directly to
churches. It is difficult to deny that, in a broader sense, tax exemptions are "aid," nd subsidy. The Court ignored that part of Everson
v. Board of Education"9 which said that government cannot pass laws
which "aid any religion."
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan also relied on
tradition, citing Mr. Justice Holmes' "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic." 3 Although not denying that exemptions are aid,
he nevertheless decided that an exemption is not a subsidy. Justice
Brennan felt the involvement in Walz was only "passive",31 and that
exemptions were not among the evils feared when the establishment
clause was put into the Constitution.32
Mr. Justice Brennan, expounding on the benefits society reaps
as a result of the exemptions, pointed out the amount of involvement
that would occur if churches were taxed, and in doing so may have
indicated his position on a question that could possibly be the next
step in the interpretation of the religion clauses: Whether or not
taxation of churches is constitutional. He seemed to suggest that
such a tax would interfere with the free exercise of religion.33
In another concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan said that
the tax exemption legislation does not affect religious participation
nor favor benefits to religious over non-religious organizations. 4 He
relied heavily on the fact that the exemptions were included within
a general exemption for non-profit organizations.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a vigorous dissent, focused squarely
on the question and unequivocally declared, "A tax exemption is
a subsidy."3 5 He urged the Court to adhere to the Torcaso v.
Watkins 6 decision which prohibited enactment of laws which aid
"believers as against non-believers."
29 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
30
31
32

New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).

397 U.S. 666, 691 (1970).
Id. at 682.

33 Id. at 691. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that termination of tax exemptions would necessitate "tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures and the direct confrontations and conflicts which follow in the
train of those legal processes." In footnote 12 of his concurring opinion in
Walz, he said a tax might conflict with the demands of the free exercise
clause.
34
Id. at 696.
35 Id. at 704.
36 367 U.S. 488 (1961). A Maryland test requiring declaration of belief
in God as a prerequisite to holding office was declared invalid.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 9
CASE COMMENTS

The majority opinion and the concurring opinions in Walz
probably reached the only practical result, since the administrative
aspects of a contrary decision might prove insurmountable, and the
political repercussions substantial. In the majority opinion, the
Chief Justice barely mentioned what could have been the Court's
strongest argument for continuing exemption - "Granting tax
exemptions . . . [is] a lesser involvement than taxing them
[churches]."" For example, how would a tax on churches be com-

puted? Would churches be classified as trusts, natural persons, or
corporations?
A tax on churches would necessitate a certain amount of
regulation which could be an interference with the free exercise of
worship. And taxation of churches would mean that a certain
amount of church money would have to set aside, thus reducing the
amount to be spent on the activities which fall into the realm of
secular interest, i.e., supporting hospitals, schools and social welfare
programs. The services churches provide might be curtailed because
of fund shortages. Sick people would converge on other hospitals
in the absence of church supported hospitals. Parochial students
would spill into the already crowded public system. Hard-pressed
state welfare programs would suffer with the greater demands.
Naturally the public would bear the ultimate loss; state and federal
budgets would have to allocate funds to provide some of the same
services.
The churches, tax exempt, are a service to communities, as are
other non-profit organizations, which as the Court pointed out,38
also benefit from the same statutory and constitutional provisions.
Therefore, a tax on religious organizations instituted by legislatures
may be a greater state interference with religion than tax exemption.
However, it appears inevitable that eventually some governing
body will attempt such a tax, and, no doubt, the Supreme Court
will have to decide its legality. As has been hinted, the Court
might well find such an enactment unconstitutional.
After examining the emphasis the Court placed on the "handsoff" attitude this country has exhibited toward the matter of church
taxation, and the stress it has placed on the fact that "free money"
37 397

38

U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
Id. at 68,
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finds its way into the public sector for its best interests, it may be
reasonably presumed the Court would examine closely any statute
taxing the churches.
CharlotteRolston

Due Process of LawWelfare Recipient's Right to Pre-termination Hearing
A New York City Department of Social Service' procedure
allowed welfare officials to discontinue assistance to welfare recipients without a hearing prior to the termination of benefits.' If
a caseworker questioned a recipient's continued eligibility, he discussed the matter with the recipient. The caseworker could then
recommend termination to a unit supervisor, who, if he concurred,
forwarded a letter to the recipient stating the justification for the
proposed termination. The recipient was then permitted to request
review by a higher official and to support this request with a written
statement. If the reviewing official affirmed the action assistance
stopped immediately, and the recipient was informed by letter of
the reasons for the action. Twenty New York City welfare recipients challenged the constitutionality of these procedures on the
grounds they violated due process in that the procedures lacked any
provision for personal appearance or oral presentation of evidence
before the reviewing official and denied the recipient the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. A three-judge federal
district court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing
would satisfy the requirements of due process.2
On appeal, 3 the United States Supreme Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly and its companion case Wheeler v. Montgomery' held, in a
5-3 decision,' that due process of law requires an adequate hearing
4

I New York City Department of Social Services Procedure No. 68-18,
implementing N. Y. Social Welfare Law § 351.26(b) (McKinney 1966).
2 Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3
Prob. juris. noted sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969).
4 397 U.S. 254 (1970), affg 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
5 397 U.S. 280 (1970). In Wheeler a three-judge federal district court in
California held that the opportunity for an informal conference with a caseworker before termination of benefits, coupled with a trial-type hearing
subsequent
to termination, satisfied due process.
6
Majority opinion by Justice Brennan in which Douglas, J., Harlan, J.,
White, J., and Marshall, J., concurred. Justice Black dissented in a separate
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